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To what extent do we need a ‘second-wave’ of writing on depoliticisation to correct the biases of 
the first and thereby to improve our capacity to gain analytical traction on the dynamic interplay 
between politicising and depoliticising tendencies in contemporary liberal democracies?  In this 
article I welcome the debate this special issue has opened, but defend the first wave against its critics.  
More specifically, I argue that the first wave literature provides ample analytical and theoretical 
resources to capture the dynamic interplay between depoliticising tendencies and politicising or 
repoliticising counter-tendencies which its critics rightly place at centre stage.  Indeed, I go further, 
suggesting that the more empirical contributions of the special issue, while bringing a series of new 
and important insights to the analysis of politicisation–depoliticisation dynamics, in fact do so by 
drawing extensively on first wave depoliticisation theory.  Such work is very necessary and advances 
significantly our understanding of depoliticising, but it extends rather than challenges first wave 
perspectives and is ultimately better characterised as ‘second generation’ rather than ‘second 
wave’. 
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Introduction
I am extremely grateful to the editors of Policy & Politics for the opportunity to 
respond to this important, innovative and challenging collection of articles on the 
process of depoliticisation and the analytical strategies required to best understand 
its sources, dynamics and consequences. There has – alas – never been a better time 
to write about depoliticisation, judging by the contempt in which so many citizens 
hold political elites in most advanced liberal democracies today and the extent to 
which political elites continue to respond by placing at one remove the inherent 
contestability of decisions concerning the provision of collective public goods. Yet, 
despite the attention that the process of depoliticisation has received, the editors of 
this collection argue for the need to rethink and reconceptualise much of our existing 
understanding of this crucial set of linked concerns. They launch, in effect, a ‘second 
wave’ literature on depoliticisation.
I typically have great sympathy for second waves. They offer a way of correcting 
the almost inevitable biases and distortions that creep into and accumulate within a 
new and often hastily developed body of literature prompted by the urgent need to 
come to terms with a recently identified problem, pathology or societal condition. 
That, I suspect, is very much the story of the first wave literature on depoliticisation, 
the limits of which this collection of articles seeks first to identify and then transcend. 
‘Second waves’ are, then, generally rather good things, providing a necessary corrective 
to errors made in (perhaps forgivable) haste. 
Here, however, I find myself somewhat more equivocal than usual. That is no 
doubt in part a product of being, perhaps for the first and only time in my career, 
identified as part of a ‘first wave’ – and proponents of first waves, as we know, have a 
tendency to make stubborn adversaries. I think, however, that there is more to this 
than that – though I suppose I would…For while there are undoubtedly certain biases 
and distortions which have come to characterise the first wave literature and while 
a number of these are well-identified in this collection (notably, the privileging of 
economic policy and nation-level decision-making processes empirically, the focus 
on depoliticisation at the expense of politicisation and the simplistic normative 
presumption that politicisation is good, depoliticisation bad), I think each is at least 
defensible as an analytic move, each is better than the alternative at the time, each 
is explicitly acknowledged (and justified) as a simplifying analytical device and, as 
a consequence, one does not need a bout of rethinking and reconceptualisation to 
correct such distortions.
In short, I think the ‘first wave’ is worthy of defending and in what follows I seek 
to provide that defence. I do so in an unapologetically provocative way, by taking 
issue with a number of the arguments and claims made in this important collection 
of articles – and by concentrating on those claims and arguments with which I take 
issue. I also do so with a profound sense of respect for and appreciation of the challenge 
these articles pose to the existing literature. There is much to learn from them, as I 
seek to make clear, just as I hope that there is much to learn from the debate and 
controversy this response aims to ignite.
Thus, although I am critical of aspects of each of the articles assembled in this 
collection, both individually and collectively I see them as making an important 
contribution to the existing literature. Yet, in the end, it is better to see that contribution 
as an extension and development of the first wave than as arising out of a clearly 
substantiated case for the need to transcend the conceptual limitations of the first wave 
in favour of a second. Consistent perhaps with such a view, I find the more empirical 
and substantive contributions with which the collection concludes ultimately more 
compelling than the more narrowly conceptual or theoretical pieces (those that 
would have to substantiate the claim for the need for a second wave and provide the 
alternative analytical bases for such a move).
In the pages that follow I seek, all too briefly, to defend such claims by considering 
each article in a little more detail. I begin with the more theoretical ones, before 
turning to the more substantive empirical pieces each of which I seek to show is 
quite compatible with the development and enrichment of the existing literature 
on depoliticisation. 
One’s enemies’ enemies … and one’s friends
Perhaps precisely because it is the most explicit, the most unequivocal and the most 
programmatic in its commitment to the idea both of the need for a second wave and 
for this collection of articles as an opening salvo, in effect, in the launching of such a 
wave, it is the introductory article by Matthew Flinders and Matthew Wood of which 
I am perhaps the most critical. The claims they make for the limits of the existing 
literature are, I think, at times a little overstated, the case they make for their approach 
to depoliticisation as a cogent and holistic alternative (such as might constitute a 
credible second wave) is not entirely compelling, and the (Schmittian) concept of 
politics on which it is ostensibly predicated I find normatively troubling, analytically 
somewhat confusing and not entirely consistent with the articles that follow. 
Their article opens by stating boldly that the ‘need for new perspectives’ on 
depoliticisation can, in the context of the ‘exceptional times’ occasioned by our 
present crisis, ‘hardly be denied’ (2014, 1). That, I think, is contestable. First, whether 
or not we live in ‘exceptional times’ and whether or not the crisis marks the passage 
from a ‘normal’ to an ‘exceptional’ phase of the political, it is problematic to assume 
that each such historical juncture requires new theoretical perspectives or even new 
conceptual resources. ‘New times’ do not require new theories. For the implication of 
such a view is that we can have no theoretically-informed account of the process of 
change itself; political analysis in effect becomes a science of equilibrium in a world 
we acknowledge to be characterised (albeit only periodically and intermittently) by 
disequilibrating ruptures.
There is, of course, a certain irony here. Indeed, there are two. The first is that this is 
exactly the kind of social science (in the form of neo-classical economic equilibrium 
theory most obviously) that led us to the crisis in the first place. It did so precisely 
because of its theoretical incapacity to countenance the possibility of disequilibrium 
(allied, of course, to its influence on those whose behaviour precipitated the crisis). 
Second, the existing literature on politicisation and depoliticisation is itself a dynamic 
theory of disequilibrium (pointing to the cumulatively destabilising consequences 
of ostensibly ‘rational’ behaviour and equilibrium thinking) – and, what is more, a 
disequilibrium theory closely linked to the anticipation and subsequent analysis of 
the crisis itself (see especially Crouch, 2004; 2008; 2009; Hay, 2006; 2007; 2011, but 
also Burnham, 2001). There is, then, something strangely perverse about making the 
case for an alternative to existing perspectives on depoliticisation by pointing to the 
extent to which the very crisis such theories anticipated (in part precisely because 
of the depoliticisation dynamic to which they pointed) has recast the parameters of 
the world in which we find ourselves. 
Quite apart from this, has it done this? Is the world in which we find ourselves today 
so very different from that described in the first wave literature? Again, I find myself 
sceptical. Yes, there has been a widely acknowledged crisis; but, as the contributions 
of Burnham, Foster et al and Jessop in this collection all make clear (echoing a well-
established orthodoxy in the wider literature), the tendency in the wake of the crisis 
has been to reaffirm and further consolidate a ‘logic of discipline’ over a logic of 
public accountability and/or democratic choice (Roberts, 2011). As such, the crisis 
(to date at least) has proved paradigm re-enforcing rather than paradigm threatening 
(Hay and Smith, 2014) in a manner again anticipated in the earlier literature. Indeed, 
it is presumably precisely for this reason that Flinders and Wood are able to refer 
to depoliticisation as the dominant model of statecraft in the twenty-first century. 
This makes it all the more confusing that the crisis might credibly be seen to signal 
the rise of a period of exceptional politics and that this, in turn, might be seen to 
necessitate a set of new perspectives on depoliticisation. A rather stronger case for 
the incapacity of existing perspectives to deal with the contemporary manifestation 
of the politicisation–depoliticisation nexus would first need to be presented. That is 
something this collection lacks. 
More troubling in a way is Flinders and Wood’s treatment of the concept of 
politics. They are of course right to seek to ground any notion of politicisation 
and depoliticisation in a concept of politics and they are also right, it strikes me, in 
seeking to think of politicisation and depoliticisation as linked concepts for capturing 
the dynamic interplay of tendency and counter-tendency (as in Hay, 2007, chapter 
2). Insofar, however, as Schmitt’s concept of politics has been ‘overlooked’ (Flinders 
and Wood, 2014, 136) in the existing literature on depoliticisation (and even this 
is something one might contest – see, for instance, Mouffe, 1993; Ranciere, 1995; 
Monagle 2010), there might well have been good reasons for this. For there are 
a range of objections to it – some specific to the debate about politicisation and 
depoliticisation, others more general.
That conception of politics is famously couched in terms of the friend/enemy 
distinction — indeed, the friend/enemy opposition. Politics, for Schmitt, is the process 
in and through which specific instances of the universal, ubiquitous, inevitable and 
inherent conflict between friend and enemy are settled — with authority, singularity 
and, above all, finality (2007, xiv). Such a conception has implications, some of 
which, to their credit, Flinders and Wood acknowledge, others which they, perhaps 
understandably, choose not to. The first implication, which Schmitt was anxious to 
emphasise and which they do acknowledge explicitly, is that liberal democracy is, in 
effect, the perpetration of a (depoliticising) fiction – in that, and to the extent that, 
it presents democratic deliberation as a means to the determination or adjudication 
of the collective good. For Schmitt there is no such thing as the collective good – 
merely the collective imposition of a singular interest or conception of the good 
over other competing interests or conceptions of the good. Politics is, in short, the 
triumph of friend over enemy; to pretend otherwise (to pretend, for instance, that 
we can all be friends within the terms of a democratic consensus) is to engage in a 
depoliticising demystification.
This is, as is perhaps already clear, a highly normative, singular and contestable 
conception of the political – and it is not difficult to see why it has proved so 
controversial. Above all, however, it is one that, whatever its appeal, poses particular 
problems when it comes to the contemporary debate in western liberal democracies 
(among political analysts and others) about politicising and depoliticising dynamics. 
Much could be said here, but I will confine myself to four brief observations. 
First, in the context of such debates, and despite Flinders and Wood’s protestations 
to the contrary, this is a somewhat limited conception of politics. It is of course useful 
to remind ourselves that all politics is concerned with the resolution of conflicts and 
that we are perhaps naïve to think that such conflicts can be resolved to the mutual 
satisfaction of all, but there is more to political life (and more to the concept of politics 
for political analysts and political practitioners) than the friend–enemy opposition. It 
is, at best, a dimension of politics – one, like many others, to which it is often useful to 
draw attention. Moreover, important though it is to be sensitive to the friend–enemy 
dimension present in all political practice, there are surely more or less appropriate 
and legitimate means of resolving the conflicts which characterise political practice. 
To dismiss all liberal democratic pretentions on the basis that they are predicated on 
the deceit that politics need not entail the triumph of a sectional interest, without first 
considering the credibility of the ensuing practice to deliver collective public goods 
(and, indeed, the contribution of politicising and/or depoliticising dynamics to such 
a capacity) seems both premature and unnecessarily defeatist. It also begs the question 
of why we would interest ourselves in the detailed internal machinations of liberal 
democratic governance if we had already made up our minds as to its central deceit. 
Second, and related to this, to draw exclusive attention in one’s definition of 
politics to the friend–enemy dimension (especially if one acknowledges that there are 
others) is to demonise politics unnecessarily. In a context in which politics is already 
widely demonised and where such demonisation has contributed significantly to the 
paradigm of depoliticisation that one is ostensibly interested in analysing, this seems 
particularly perverse. Again, there is a paradox here. For part of Flinders and Wood’s 
objection to the existing (first wave) literature on depoliticisation is that it is, in their 
terms, overly normative – in that it tends towards the ‘rather stale denunciation of 
depoliticisation as inherently…“bad”’ (2014, 145). If normativity is the problem, then 
settling on an unapologetically normative (if pejorative) definition of politics (where, 
of course, the first wave literature has a neutral analytic definition) hardly seems like 
an appropriate antidote.
Indeed, one could go further. Though I acknowledge this to be a personal view I, 
for one, would wish staunchly to defend the normative stance of much of the (first 
wave) literature on depoliticisation, just as I would wish equally staunchly to defend 
the idea that politicised governance (which is visibly deliberative and accountable) 
is normatively preferable to depoliticised governance (in which decisions are made 
ostensibly in the public good but in private and without the capacity for public 
scrutiny). Political analysts (particularly those in receipt of public funds), I would 
contend, have at least a collective public duty to hold the practices of ostensibly 
democratic governance to account – and that, I think, entails a normative preference 
for politicised over depoliticised governance (even if it is possible to imagine 
circumstances under which depoliticisation might be deemed necessary). I suspect 
Flinders and Wood would agree, but the point is that I find it difficult to reconcile 
such a normative conviction with the Schmittian conception of politics which they 
here seek to advance.
A third problem with the turn to Schmitt is at the same time both semantic and 
practical. The Schmittian definition of politics threatens to turn on its head, in a way 
that Flinders and Wood fail fully to appreciate, the language of politicisation and 
depoliticisation in and through which the debate has been conducted up until this 
point. The potential for confusion is very considerable. The point is a simple one. If 
politics is, for Schmitt, a synonym for friend–enemy adversity and politicisation is, 
consequently, an index in effect of the clarity with which friend–enemy rivalries are 
articulated in ostensibly political contexts, then much of what we have been calling 
depoliticisation is politicising in Schmittian terms and much of what we have been 
calling politicisation is depoliticising! Flinders and Wood’s own example may serve 
to clarify the nature of the confusion (if not the confusion itself). Their argument is 
that, in the exceptional circumstances of crisis, policy makers typically feel the need 
to assume greater decision-making powers and typically also feel less encumbered 
by the need to legitimate or justify their decisions in terms of the democratic wishes 
of the citizens they (for the most part) claim to represent. In conventional terms this 
is likely to prove depoliticising – in that political elites are likely to invoke the ‘harsh 
economic realities’ and ‘non-negotiable constraints’ of the exceptional circumstances 
in which they find themselves in defending whatever policy choices they feel it 
necessary to impose, however unpopular these might prove (austerity through 
swinging welfare retrenchment is a good example). In Schmittian terms, however, the 
authority, decisiveness and finitude with which friend–enemy rivalries are clarified, 
crystallised and resolved in such moments is deeply politicising – not least because the 
depoliticising pretentions of liberal democratic mythology are temporarily suspended 
(such is the nature of the exceptionalism to which Schmitt points). The imposition 
of austerity in Greece may well be deeply depoliticising, then, in conventional terms 
(as, for instance, in Jessop’s account); but it is deeply politicising in Schmitt’s terms 
(and, one can only surmise, those of Flinders and Wood). 
Rethinking depoliticisation
Wood and Flinders’ substantive contribution is very different from the introduction 
and, despite its somewhat iconoclastic title – ‘rethinking depoliticisation’ – is, for 
the most part, quite consistent with much of the existing literature. It argues, in 
effect, for a widening of the focus of our analysis of contemporary depoliticisation 
dynamics so that we might better capture and respect their ‘full complexity’ (Wood 
and Flinders, 2014, 1). Crucially, though, it makes its case for so doing on the basis 
of insights already present within the literature it ostensibly rethinks and recasts – 
notably the three-fold distinction between governmental, public and private arenas 
as potential sites of politicisation and depoliticisation and the dynamic interplay 
between these competing tendencies (Hay, 2007, 79) – rather than, say, by reference 
to the Schmittian conception of politics discussed in the introduction. As such, if it 
is compatible at all with the idea of a second wave of writing on depoliticisation (as 
per the same authors’ introduction), this is a very much more modest second wave, 
seemingly quite prepared to work with the categories introduced in the first. That 
makes it one with which I am much more comfortable. 
Wood and Flinders’ contribution is cogent, compelling and well-informed and 
there is much to commend in it. Accordingly, my critical comments are of a relatively 
minor kind.
First, I have always been somewhat sceptical of the idea that the extent to which 
a theoretical perspective might capture the ‘complexity’ of the world it seeks to 
analyse is an unambiguous token of its value or sophistication. The trump card of 
added complexity is an easy one to pull from one’s hat, but I am not convinced that 
it always constitutes a winning move. This is because the purpose of political analysis 
must surely be to achieve some kind of analytical purchase on the subjects and objects 
of enquiry – here the processes and practices of politicisation and depoliticisation, 
especially in as much as these might become self-sustaining or mutually reinforcing 
in some way.  That analytical purchase necessarily entails achieving a certain degree of 
parsimony. There is bound to be much complexity in the phenomena that attract our 
attentions, but our task has to be to cut through at least some of this to reveal certain 
general features of the objects of our analysis. Analytical purchase, in other words, 
entails a necessary simplification. The question then becomes how much complexity 
to let in. Once restated in such terms it is far from self-evident that ‘more complexity’ 
(or, as here, ‘full complexity’) makes for better political analysis. 
Indeed, there is surely a second issue here. For Woods and Flinders are (here) entering 
the debate after an initial flurry of interest in the topic has subsided somewhat. Their 
‘second wave’ intervention has the advantage of ‘first wave’ hindsight. This undoubtedly 
makes it all the easier to play the ‘greater complexity’ trump card. First wave literatures 
are almost bound to cut through more of the complexity of the phenomena they 
analyse than their second wave counterparts. There is, I think, nothing wrong with 
that, even if the subsequent maturation of the literature is bound to let in a little more 
complexity. One can, in other words, welcome both – and I do.
That said, I rather like Wood and Flinders’ chosen strategy for mapping the field 
of politicisation and depoliticisation processes. I think its appeal in fact comes from 
its simplicity – its parsimony or elegance, if you like – rather than its complexity 
or its capacity to acknowledge complexity, as they would have it. Indeed, if there 
are problems with their formulation – and I think there are – they come largely 
from trying to squeeze too much complexity into a relatively simple three-fold 
categorisation of the field of de/politicisation. There is much which could be said 
here, but limits of space confine me to three (simple) observations.
The first is that Woods and Flinders conflate, even if they do not confuse, a number 
of things in their summary table in which they seek to distinguish the three faces of 
depoliticisation (2014, 6). In particular, it strikes me, they associate too closely the 
mode of depoliticisation with the arenas or sites from which/to which responsibility 
is passed when issues become depoliticised. Thus, they associate type 1 depoliticisation, 
in my view, too narrowly with delegation, type 2 depoliticisation with privatisation 
and type 3 depoliticisation with the (discursive) denial of political choice altogether 
– when each might be seen as compatible with a range of different processes.
Second, it is a shame that the Lukesian analogy hinted at by the appeal to the 
‘three faces’ of depoliticisation is not developed. For this would, I think, provide 
a basis for better conceptualising the linkage between modes of depoliticisation 
(or, indeed, politicisation) and arenas or sites of depoliticisation (or politicisation). 
Decision making, agenda setting and preference shaping can all, of course, be more 
or less politicised – and each might be seen to be associated with different types or 
modes of politicisation and depoliticisation. I see considerable potential in the further 
sustained reflection on such linkages.
Finally, though the concept undoubtedly has a certain intuitive appeal, there are some 
problems I think with the (present) operationalisation of the concept of discursive 
depoliticisation. For, as used by Wood and Flinders, at least in this article, the concept 
relates solely to type 3 depoliticisation – the denial, in effect, that an issue has or might 
be seen to have a politics since there is perceived to be no contingency which a political 
process might debate, discuss and thereby resolve. This, I think, is problematic – not 
because such denials are not themselves inherently discursive (I think they are), but 
because there is a discursive component to all depoliticisations (whatever their type). 
Thus, when for instance operational independence is ceded to the Bank of England 
for the setting of monetary policy this is as much a discursive depoliticisation as it 
is an institutional one; it is unhelpful to think of discursive depoliticisation as being 
involved only in depoliticisation processes of type 3. 
Yet these are all modest objections to a conceptual mapping exercise that I find 
broadly persuasive, analytically elegant and eminently useful. Whether it constitutes a 
rethinking of depoliticisation is perhaps another matter altogether – but it is certainly 
a very valuable stock-taking exercise from which we can all benefit. 
The link to political participation
No less useful – though also no less ostensibly iconoclastic – is Paul Fawcett and 
David Marsh’s important set of reflections on the links between depoliticisation and 
political participation. As they will appreciate, these are themes very close to my own 
political heart and it is refreshing to see them debated in some detail in this special 
issue by authors who have already contributed so much to their analysis.
It is perhaps precisely because these themes are so close to my own motivation for 
writing about depoliticisation that I find their opening observation – that the links 
between the literatures on depoliticisation, governance and political participation have 
been insufficiently explored – a slightly strange one. Why we hate politics (2007) was, 
of course, largely a book about political participation and one that drew me into the 
analysis of both depoliticisation and governance (and the relationship between the 
two). Accordingly, I see these issues, like Fawcett and Marsh, as intimately connected. 
I suspect, however, that we are not alone in so doing – and that Fawcett and Marsh 
somewhat overstate the size of the gap in the literature they seek to fill.
That said, what is most important here is not the extent of the oversight in the 
existing literature, but the degree to which Fawcett and Marsh’s reflections offer 
us new insight into these key connections – and, for the most part and with some 
caveats, I think they offer us a very great deal of insight. Their observations are 
helpfully summarised in terms of four key claims, each of which is worth discussing 
in a little more detail. 
Their first claim takes the form of a warning – that the novelty of the term 
depoliticisation might lead us to exaggerate the novelty of the phenomena we use the 
term to describe. Or, in other words, that we are in danger of overstating the historically 
unprecedented character of the contemporary condition of depoliticisation. There is 
certainly something in this, but there is a converse danger here too…and a certain irony.
Fawcett and Marsh are clearly right to suggest that there is nothing new about the 
deployment by political elites of strategies of what we might now term depoliticisation. 
Politicians have always invoked non-negotiable external binds and constraints 
(sometimes genuinely, sometimes disingenuously). They have typically played fast 
and loose with their capacity to realise the wishes of those who elected them and, 
even before that, those without whose support their tenure in office might prove 
more precarious. There is nothing new about any of this; but that is perhaps not 
the point. Arguably, depoliticisation dynamics proceed rather differently today – in 
ways that it is important that we are attuned to. This is where there is a certain irony 
in Fawcett and Marsh’s contribution. For it is precisely by reflecting on the issues 
of governance and meta-governance that they foreground so effectively that we 
come to see what is historically distinctive and perhaps even unprecedented about 
the form (if not necessarily the extent) of depoliticisation today. The point is that 
depoliticisation has become institutionalised and ideationally embedded – in new 
public management theory most obviously. This is precisely why Flinders and Wood 
(2014, 135) can speak of depoliticisation as the ‘dominant model of statecraft’ in the 
twenty-first century. That is new, even if depoliticisation itself is not. So, yes, a sense 
of historical perspective is important; but that should not lead us to understate the 
alarmingly distinctive nature of our current political predicament.
Their second observation is that much of the literature on depoliticisation casts 
politicians themselves as the villains of the piece. This is an important point and 
one with which, again, I have some considerable sympathy. This is not least because, 
like Fawcett and Marsh, I am of the view that the disdain in which citizens seem 
increasingly to hold political elites is perhaps the single greatest political pathology of 
our age – and one that, unless held in check, may in time threaten the very legitimacy 
of our democratic political culture. The issues here are complex. On the one hand there 
are those who openly advocate depoliticisation and whose case for depoliticisation 
proceeds precisely (and logically) from the presupposition that politicians are narrowly 
instrumental and self-serving. If the presumption is valid then politics can only ever 
be the triumph of sectional interests over the general interest (à la Schmitt) and we 
should have as little of it as we can get away with.1 Yet, on the other hand, there are 
those who denounce depoliticisation as a disavowal by political elites of the trust we 
place in them and who typically see political disaffection and disengagement as, at 
least in part, a reasonable (even rational) response to the resulting emptying of the 
content of the democratic process. As Fawcett and Marsh start to hint at, however, 
it is actually even more complex than this. For there is, in fact, quite a fine line 
between accounts of this kind and the castigation of self-serving political elites for 
the duplicitous appeal to depoliticising tactics and strategies to insulate themselves 
from criticism. The paradox is that such critiques may serve to reinforce precisely the 
impression that politicians are, and can only ever be, in it for themselves.
So how might one seek to chart a path through this conceptual – and yet at the 
same time, acutely political – minefield? Fawcett and Marsh pose the problem, but they 
don’t really resolve it. Crucial, I think are the motivations we project on to political 
actors. If political elites are, indeed, instrumental self-serving utility-maximisers (the 
homo economicus-cum-politicus of public choice theory) then depoliticisation is the best 
we can hope for. If political elites are capable of exhibiting other motivational traits, 
however, then the scenario is an altogether different one. That suggests to me, at least, 
that in a climate of widespread and growing political disaffection (such as ours), we 
should be careful to avoid projecting instrumental motives onto political actors unless 
and until we have very good reason for thinking that this is the key to their behaviour. 
We should, in effect, give them the benefit of the doubt for as long as it is credible 
to do so. For the cost of not so doing, in terms of the potential for the demise of our 
democratic political culture, is simply too high a price to pay for our predilection to 
cynicism. The point is that we do not need to appeal to the instrumental motives of 
political elites in order to explain the pervasive depoliticisation we have witnessed. 
Altogether more credible, I think, is that political elites engage in depoliticisation not 
because they think it is in their own self-interest so to do, but because they have been 
convinced (and have convinced themselves) that it is in our interests for them to do 
so. They are almost certainly wrong in this conviction; and we need now to convince 
them that this is indeed the case. Calling their motives into question is unlikely to 
prove an effective means to that end.
Fawcett and Marsh’s third claim is no less significant and no less involved. It is that 
the existing literature fails to give equal attention, in its analysis of political participation 
in particular, to political inputs and political outputs – tending to focus on the former 
at the expense of the latter. This is almost certainly right, though I have more problem 
with the way in which Fawcett and Marsh propose that we address this input-oriented 
bias – through an extensive engagement with the work of Henrik Bang. Limits of 
space prevent a detailed treatment of the complex issues involved here, so I restrict 
myself to two simple points. First, inputs and outputs, as I am sure Fawcett and Marsh 
would acknowledge, are interdependent not independent. Consequently, privileging 
the latter over the former (as, arguably, Bang does) is no solution to our problem. 
Second, and far more important, to my mind, Fawcett and Marsh are undoubtedly 
right to note that secular trends in political participation in recent years are not just 
about a decline in the use made of formal channels of engagement (such as voting). 
They are also about the constitution of new forms of political identity and subjectivity, 
typically in non-formal arenas. However important such developments are, though, 
they are no substitute for formal political engagement – not least if part of their appeal 
resides precisely in their non-formal character. Consequently, while it is crucial that 
we pay due attention to such trends, we cannot afford to comfort ourselves with the 
thought that participation has suffered not a secular decline so much as a change in 
form, when something very significant has nonetheless been lost.
Their final point is no less significant. It is that the existing literature has failed, in 
effect, to ask directly enough who has benefited from the process of depoliticisation 
we have witnessed in recent years. This, too, may well be right – the answer, such 
as there is one in the existing literature (and it probably varies), is implicit rather 
than explicit. But they are wrong, I think, to attribute the failure of the existing 
(first wave) literature to pose such questions directly to its discourse-analytical, 
constructivist and/or post-structuralist theoretical disposition. One does not need 
to be a ‘materialist’ (whatever precisely one takes that to signify these days) in order 
to think that the consolidation of systems of governance and meta-governance (such 
as might be associated with depoliticisation as a mode of statecraft, for instance) 
generates, reinforces, institutionalises, embeds and re-embeds significant distributional 
asymmetries. It would not be difficult to infer the character of such asymmetries, for 
instance, from the (constructivist institutionalist) analysis presented in Why we hate 
politics. Thus, to pick a particular and familiar example, the insulation of monetary 
policy in an operationally independent Bank of England has undoubtedly served to 
favour those with access to the housing market (and to the sources of credit thereby 
facilitated) relative to those in the rental market (in that it has contributed significantly 
to a low interest rate–low inflation equilibrium).
Depoliticisation in and through crisis
Peter Burnham’s important contribution to the special issue reminds us of his central 
contribution to the analysis of depoliticisation, in particular his role in providing the 
initial framing and definition of the concept – a definition still used today. His piece 
begins by reiterating that definition.
Depoliticisation, for him, is the process of placing ‘at one remove the politically 
contested character of governing’ (2014, 1, see also Burnham, 2001). This is an 
important and extremely useful definition – and it is worth reflecting on it a little, if 
only to clear up a potential ambiguity in the literature. For depoliticisation, at least in 
this conception, is not really about an end to politics or an absence of politics or even 
some kind of quantitative reduction in the amount of politics present. Depoliticisation 
is not about less politics, but about a displaced and submerged politics – a politics 
occurring elsewhere, typically beyond sites and arenas in which it is visible to non-
participants and hence amenable to public – perhaps even democratic – scrutiny. 
It is for precisely this reason, presumably, that Burnham can go on to suggest 
that the depoliticisation of decision-making processes may, paradoxically, serve to 
enhance political control – in that a politics conducted largely behind closed doors 
is less encumbered by external pressures and influences and more autonomous as a 
consequence.
Such a definition is extremely appealing, even if the process it describes is far from 
appealing. It certainly seems to capture much of the distinctiveness of democratic (or 
perhaps, better, pseudo-democratic) governance in western liberal democracies today. 
Yet there is a danger here, one to which I have already alluded. For depoliticisation 
thus understood is invariably a sinister and subterranean device used by political 
elites to insulate themselves from critique in order more effectively to impose their 
(presumably malevolent) desires upon those subject to their power. There is, in other 
words, a conspiratorial sub-text to much of this. To be fair to him, Burnham is quite 
explicit and unapologetic about this sub-text, not least in the present contribution 
– and in that sense it is, for him, less a sub-text than a text. The danger, however, is
that it remains a sub-text (buried somewhere in the submerged assumptions about 
political elites) that spills over largely unacknowledged into much of the secondary 
literature which draws on this definition (and which may not share those assumptions).
There is also a second problem. For much of what we typically describe as 
depoliticisation does not fall easily within the terms of this particular definition. Thus, 
for instance, the delegation of decision-making discretion to a panel of experts is not 
a case of depoliticisation, unless of course one assumes that the decisions of such a 
panel are in fact precisely those that would have been made by the political elites who 
appointed them (or that they reflect a singular sectional or class interest). We are back 
to conspiracy again. The point is that it is not as easy as it is invariably assumed to be 
to disentangle this definition from the assumptions which inform Burnham’s more 
general approach to governance in capitalist societies – and those assumptions, about 
the motivations of political elites in particular, are distinctly instrumental. Burnham, 
it need hardly be pointed out, is not very interested in giving politicians the benefit 
of the doubt; and in that sense, his account of depoliticisation comes close to the 
demonisation of politics and politicians against which Fawcett and Marsh (rightly) 
warn us. That in itself is not a problem; but it may well pose problems for those who 
do not share such assumptions, but who are nonetheless attracted to the definition 
of depoliticisation that he offers. 
The implications of such an approach Burnham makes very clear in the present 
contribution, which is concerned with the relationship between capitalist economic 
crises and the process of depoliticisation. These he sees as intimately, rather than 
contingently (or politically), linked – and, for me, this is the problem. Indeed, in essence 
there are two problems here – a certain fatalism about crisis and crisis resolution on 
the one hand and an associated functionalism about capitalist reproduction in and 
through crisis on the other.
Burnham’s fatalism, as I see it, is bound up with his conviction that during capitalist 
crises state managers seek, and can only seek, ‘to re-establish the law of value while 
placing other key areas of policy beyond direct political contestation’ (2014, 8). The 
problem with such a formulation is that it removes much of the political contingency 
(and hence, in effect, much of the politics) of the moment of crisis itself. Crises are, 
and can only be, resolved in one way – through the forcible re-imposition of the law 
of value (through austerity for instance) at the expense, of course, of the working 
class. Depoliticisation, for Burnham, is merely an efficient institutional mechanism 
for dealing with the political side-effects of such a necessity; though it is not strictly 
guaranteed by crisis management, it is almost bound to be reinforced by it, insofar as 
it is likely to make the restoration of the law of value a simpler task.
There are, I think, two important objections to such a view: that it is politically 
fatalistic and that it is functionalist (perhaps more accurately, dysfunctionalist). It is 
fatalistic in that it precludes the possibility that the global financial crisis that we have 
just witnessed, for instance, could have been responded to in any way other than 
through austerity. That, I think, is wrong. For crises are, I would contend, politically 
contingent; and, moreover, until they are resolved they remain politically contingent. 
Thus, while it was in no sense guaranteed that the crisis would be responded to 
predominantly through austerity in the first instance in a paradigm-reinforcing way, 
it was always very likely that the existing paradigm would be tested to destruction 
before any new paradigm might emerge in its stead. The point is that the crisis is far 
from over and that austerity (the forcible re-imposition of the law of value) has done 
much more to lengthen and deepen the crisis than it has done to resolve it.
That leads us to the problem of functionalism. For in this article, at least, Burnham 
simply assumes that: (1) austerity is the form taken by the re-imposition of the law of 
value in the wake of the current crisis; (2) the re-imposition of the law of value (here, 
through austerity) is a condition of the resolution of the crisis; and (3) since austerity 
is a condition of the resolution of the crisis there can be no other resolution (and, 
as such, it will come to pass). Each of these assumptions, it strikes me, is contestable. 
Above all else, it is far from self-evident that austerity is good economics (see for 
instance Blyth, 2013) – and it is certainly no functional fix for the crisis in which 
we still remain mired. One might well argue that austerity has already proved itself 
extremely dysfunctional in restoring the law of value. Indeed, one could develop this 
line of reasoning to suggest that it is precisely because crises are politically contingent 
that capitalist economies can choose responses to them (like austerity) which are 
liable to prove so economically damaging.
Neologising depoliticisation
Of all the contributions to the present collection, it is Bob Jessop’s which has 
the potential most to redefine how we think about and analyse politicisation–
depoliticisation dynamics. As such, it is perhaps the closest to offering a manifesto for 
a ‘second wave’ literature on depoliticisation – albeit one significantly at odds with 
the introduction (whose focus on Schmitt it explicitly – and I think rightly – rejects). 
It is also, in a way, the most difficult to assess, to evaluate and to comment on. 
The problem boils down to whether or not we need the novel conceptual 
framework he develops in the first half of his contribution to understand the dynamic 
interplay of politicising and depoliticising tendencies that he explores so incisively 
in the second. I am not convinced.
That said, there is undoubtedly a great deal of analytical insight in the second half 
of this article in which Jessop develops, all too briefly to my mind, a penetrating and 
original perspective on responses to the North Atlantic financial crisis (as he terms it). 
I am not at all convinced, however, that we need the conceptual armoury he develops 
in the first half of the article to reach these conclusions. That said, I am acutely aware 
that I may well be missing something here. For me, the three-fold distinction between 
politisation, politicalisation and politicisation (and their ‘depol-’ analogues) that Jessop 
develops simply lacks the intuitive capacity to animate and capture something of its 
subject matter that I typically associate with his conceptual work. I can tell you what 
a Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime is and where you might find one; 
but I struggle to differentiate clearly in my own mind between depolitisation and 
depoliticalisation – and I find myself genuinely unconvinced that they illuminate the 
substantive processes he describes so well.
More fundamentally, I see Jessop’s chosen theoretical armoury as providing 
inadequate resources for conceptualising – let alone reconceptualising – politicisation–
depoliticisation dynamics. Let me try to explain why. 
First, what I find perhaps most frustrating about this article is its failure to engage 
with the existing literature on this topic. A great deal has been written on politicisation 
and depoliticisation, not least by those brought together in this collection of articles. 
Before building a new conceptual apparatus for interrogating the object of analysis of 
this literature, it is surely first necessary to consider the conceptual resources – limited 
though they may well be – already available and to explain, in a sense, how the new 
conceptual architecture relates to and goes beyond the old. Thus, although Jessop 
tells us that the concept of depoliticisation requires disambiguation he gives precious 
little sense of how it has been used by those who have deployed it to explore themes 
similar to those he considers here. That is a shame – not least because it makes it far 
more difficult to see what is at stake in adjudicating a choice between competing 
conceptual paradigms. 
Second, and perhaps related, I think we should have a certain reticence and 
reluctance about advancing new conceptual schema – especially where the limitations 
of the existing conceptual resources have yet to be established. Were we engaged in 
a solely intellectual exercise this might well be legitimate; but where (as here) we are 
exploring some of the most pressing political pathologies of our age in the hope that 
we might contribute to resolving them, I think it is far less tolerable. That is perhaps 
a little too strong; but I would argue, passionately, that when we write on topics 
like depoliticisation – particularly when we acknowledge (as in the contribution of 
Fawcett and Marsh) the links to other political pathologies of our times like pervasive 
political disaffection and disengagement – we have at minimum a responsibility to 
translate whatever insights our theoretically-informed analyses generate into a language 
which is accessible to others. The creation of a new conceptual armoury is by no 
means incompatible with that, but it certainly doesn’t make our task any easier. Here 
I remain unconvinced that the theoretical and conceptual innovation is a condition 
of generating the insights of the more substantive analysis.
One of the reasons for that is that there are some obvious problems with the 
categories Jessop deploys here. First, rather surprisingly given the characteristic range 
and breadth of the strategic–relational approach, the focus on polity, politics and policy, 
certainly as developed here, encourages Jessop to focus rather narrowly on the formal 
and governmental aspects of the political. The narrowness of this focus is made clear 
when he explains the links between the three fields he identifies: ‘the constitution 
of the polity…affects unevenly capacities to engage in politics…and this in turn 
constrains the range of feasible policies’ (2014, 2). This state-centrism is compounded 
in his definition of politics as referring to ‘formally instituted, organised or informal 
practices that are directly oriented to, or otherwise shape, the exercise of state power’ 
(2014, 3). There is nothing necessarily wrong with this formulation, but: (1) it is a 
much more limited and state-centric conception of politics and the political than 
that deployed by any of the other authors in this collection; and, consequently, (2) it 
circumscribes much more tightly than in the existing literature the field over which 
politicisation and depoliticisation processes might be seen to range.
Second, despite the title of the article, there is very little politics in Jessop’s analysis – 
the depoliticisation he maps, charts and describes so well is in fact never repoliticised. 
We gain little traction on the question of what motivates political elites in response 
to this particular crisis to engage in the various depoliticising practices that Jessop 
describes, save other than a rather vague sense (consistent in a way with Burnham’s 
contribution), that depoliticisation is functionally efficacious for them insofar as it 
insulates them from critique and facilitates the imposition of swinging austerity. We 
are, once again, in danger of demonising politics and politicians without first seeking 
to gauge a sense of their motivations.
Third, and partly as a consequence, Jessop’s use of his own categories helps him re-
describe in more abstract terms the response to the crisis (or aspects of it), but it does 
not contribute towards (and in fact leads him to stop short of offering) an explanation 
for that response. There is very little sense here of why any of this happened in the 
way that it did and what the points of contingency were in this process. In lieu of 
explanation, and in contrast to some of the more empirical contributions to this 
special issue, we are offered only abstracted re-description. In effect, Jessop’s article 
generates a series of categories which he shows can be applied to the empirical 
phenomena of the depoliticised response to the crisis. That is certainly valuable, but 
it begs the question of causation. 
Depoliticised governance as governmentality
Emma Foster, Peter Kerr and Christopher Byrne’s excellent and highly original 
article builds essentially from a critique of one of the core claims made early in 
Bob Jessop’s article – that whereas politicisation involves extending the frontiers 
of the polity, depoliticisation involves rolling them back (2014, 6). This Foster et al 
challenge, drawing creatively and ultimately convincingly on Foucault’s writings on 
governmentality. In so doing and without explicitly acknowledging it, they remind 
us that depoliticisation, certainly as defined by Burnham, is not about less politics 
but about a different kind of politics altogether. In effect, their article charts, details 
and describes the subterranean institutional and ideational ensemble (of depoliticised 
and, for them, neoliberal governance as governmentality) that has emerged in the 
shadows of an ostensibly (but in fact only superficially) retreating state.
Though I am no Foucauldian and do have some objections to the at times rather 
agentless, holistic and amorphous conception of change that it presents, I have very 
considerable sympathy for this article. It surprises me, just as I suspect it surprises the 
authors, that Foucault’s writings on governmentality have not been brought before 
into the literature on depoliticisation. That such natural affinities and synergies had 
not previously been explored, however, arguably just makes Foster et al’s contribution 
all the more significant. I have little other than admiration for this article — certainly 
as an exploration of the heuristic value of rethinking depoliticisation through a 
Foucauldian lens — and can, as a consequence, deal with it a little more sparingly.
That said, there are some tensions and difficulties within it which, though far 
from irresolvable, require some further reflection in the ongoing development and 
application of this potentially highly fruitful approach to questions of politicisation 
and depoliticisation. I confine myself here to four of these. 
First, I think the central claim of this article – that, far from rolling back the state, 
the advent and consolidation of a depoliticised neoliberal governmentality represents 
a rolling forward of the state – is over-stated and in fact in danger of distracting us 
from a rather more important point. Indeed, it strikes me that, rather perversely, there 
is almost something of a quantitative fetish at work here. Foster et al are so keen, it 
seems, to make and defend the (quantitative) claim that we have not less state (as so 
many of us have been fooled into thinking) but more state, that they fail adequately 
to detail, describe and defend (qualitatively) the much more important claim about 
the character and form of the (subterranean) web of governance that has grown in 
the shadows of the seemingly rapidly receding state. This is not a profound problem, 
in that it might easily be rectified in subsequent writing. What, however, this article 
fails to provide, while perhaps whetting one’s appetite for, is an account of the state’s 
changing point(s), mode(s) and rationalities of intervention.  At the same time, it strikes 
me that the claim that there has been an ‘insidious rolling forward of state power’ is 
contestable. Central bank independence, for instance, may well better insulate (neo)-
monetarist (or, in Foster et al’s terms, neoliberal) monetary policy from democratic 
scrutiny and political contestation, but I do not really see how it represents a rolling 
forward of the state.
Second, there is something of a tendency in this article, common to much of the 
wider literature on neoliberal governmentality, to conflate governmentality on the 
one hand and neoliberal governmentality on the other. The term neoliberalism is not 
really defined and is used, it strikes me, rather loosely to refer simply to the pervasive 
societal, political and economic presuppositions of our age whatever they happen 
to be. This, I think, lacks precision and, in the end, makes it rather more difficult 
for Foster et al to identify the extent to which new points, modes and rationalities 
of state intervention have emerged, the extent to which they remain contested, the 
tensions within them and their consequences for those subject (directly or indirectly) 
to their effects. 
This, in turn, contributes to a third problem – the rather amorphous, hermetic 
and above all agentless conception of the rise of neoliberal governmentality as an 
inexorable, inevitable and irresistible force. Clearly one does not need to be wedded 
normatively, politically or ideologically to neoliberalism in order to exhibit neoliberal 
rationalities – and this, of course, makes it much more difficult to account for the 
institutionalisation and diffusion of neoliberal norms and modes of governance. 
We do, however, need rather more of a sense of where they come from, how they 
have proliferated, how they have become institutionalised and also how they might 
be resisted than Foster et al seem at present capable of providing. Once again, it 
seems, the closest we get to this is a rather vague sense that depoliticised neoliberal 
governmentality exists and has become institutionally consolidated because it is 
functional for the perpetration of something malign and insidious. That clearly will 
not do.
Finally, and perhaps unremarkably, there is a very clear normative sense in Foster et 
al’s article that depoliticised neoliberal governmentality is a sinister thing and a malign 
force – and that, consequently, something potentially precious and valuable is lost in 
the transition from whatever predated depoliticised neoliberal governmentality to 
what we have today. They remain, however, very unclear about the nature of this loss, 
and that, I think, is a major problem. In general, their depiction of politics, politicians 
(insofar as they feature at all) and the motives of political elites gives very little clue 
as to why we might prefer a more clearly politicised mode of governance to the dull 
conformity engendered by neoliberal rationalities writ large. That, too, will not do. 
If we are to repoliticise depoliticisation, as I think we must, as part of an argument 
for restoring a politics that is conducted in public and that is visibly deliberative 
(certainly more visibly deliberative than that we have today) then we need to be very 
clear about what it is about such a politics that is valuable and worthy of struggling 
for. Foster et al give us a very strong sense of what is wrong with what we have, but 
they currently give us very little sense of what we might wish to put in its place.
Second wave or second generation? Towards an empirical 
reappraisal of depoliticisation
This brings me, with some considerable enthusiasm, to the three more empirical and 
substantive contributions to the present collection of articles. These are universally 
excellent – and they suggest to me at least that if the literature on politicisation and 
depoliticisation is to develop, as I think it must, it is perhaps best to do so by engaging 
in detail and a manner that it has thus far largely failed to do with a series of empirical 
instances (or cases) of politicising–depoliticising dynamics and to reflect on (and to 
seek to resolve) the limitations of the existing theoretical literature in the light of that 
engagement. That is precisely what each of these articles sets out to do and precisely 
what each achieves. Taken together they constitute a very significant contribution to 
our understanding of politicisation and depoliticisation – though one, I think, more 
consistent with the idea of a second generation of writing and scholarship on the subject 
rather than a second wave at odds with the first.
Given my sympathy for each of these articles and the considerable synergies 
between them, I will consider them together and in somewhat less detail than the 
more theoretical pieces reviewed above. Indeed, I will merely seek to pull out three 
themes – one from each article – which emerge from their empirical analyses and 
do my best to explain their (considerable) significance in the context of the broader 
literature.
The first of these concerns the dynamic interplay over time of politicisation and 
depoliticisation dynamics which emerges most clearly as an issue in the truly excellent 
and, I think, extremely important article on the Father’s Clause parliamentary debates 
in the UK by Stephen Bates, Laura Jenkins and Fran Amery. This article, more than 
any other contribution to this collection, charts new ground by opening up in a 
richly empirical way questions of temporality which have thus far tended not to be 
explored in any detail in the literature on politicisation and depoliticisation (save 
other than a few suggestive comments in the introductory article). In particular, Bates 
et al show – or at least hint strongly – at a phased relationship over time between 
the relative politicisation of an issue in different domains or arenas. I would suggest, 
though this is in fact not an argument that they themselves make, that we would expect 
to see the same phased relationship (or chronology) that they describe conserved 
(to a greater or lesser extent) between different cases. Their example, policy related 
to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), is an excellent one in that arguably 
it did not exist as a political issue (a potential subject or object of legal regulation) 
before and until the birth of the first ‘test-tube baby’, Louise Brown, in July 1978. As 
such, Bates et al are able to chart the relative politicisation of the question of ART 
regulation across time from the first identification of the issue as political. This they 
do, usefully deploying Wood and Finders’ distinction between discursive, societal and 
formal/governmental modes of politicisation. Their argument can be summarised 
schematically as follows.
The birth of Louise Brown has the effect of generating a political space (a realm 
of contingency and potential governance) that did not previously exist (in that such 
questions of reproduction were previously deemed natural rather than social or 
political in kind). In this sense, the advent of ARTs is discursively politicising; it also 
has the effect of generating a regulatory vacuum and that, in turn, rapidly leads to 
the development of a societal controversy about how ARTs should be governed. As 
this suggests type 3 politicisation is rapidly followed by type 2 (societal) politicisation 
in anticipation of a governmental and legislative response (type 1 politicisation). This 
type 2 politicisation we might expect to take the form of an agenda-setting debate 
and this, in turn, we might expect to influence (albeit only selectively) the type 1 
decision-making process. Finally, we might expect the initiation of a formal decision-
making process in parliament to lead to a societal repoliticisation of the issue as the 
wider public debate is reignited by the formal political controversy surrounding 
the appropriate regulatory regime. Once this is settled, however, and legislation is 
passed, we might expect to see a waning of both societal and formal/governmental 
politicisation. Figure 1 presents an albeit stylised representation of that chronology 
– in effect the natural life-cycle of a formally politicised issue. The point, however,
is that this is a chronology that one might expect to be replicated in other instances 
of policy making – and, insofar as that is indeed the case, this is a very important 
observation in the context of the developing literature. 
Caroline Kuzemko draws our attention to a similar, and similarly overlooked, issue – 
namely the extent to which the pathologies of depoliticised modes of governance (here 
those issuing from the privatisation of energy policy) might themselves contribute to, 
or even serve directly to unleash, powerful repoliticising dynamics. This, too, is a rich 














and fascinating contribution. Her argument, cogent and compelling in equal measure, 
is that the effective loss of governance capacity associated with the privatisation and 
light-touch regulation of energy provision in the UK contributed to the instability of 
this depoliticised governance regime. For it exposed such a regime to the possibility 
(and, indeed, the subsequent reality) of repoliticisation through discursive securitisation 
– in and through which concerns (largely spurious, as it turns out) about the security
of the UK’s energy supply (particularly its perceived reliance on Russian pipelines) led 
to depoliticised governance being repoliticised and (partially) reconstituted. As with 
the Bates et al’s article there are, I think, wider implications of Kuzemko’s contribution. 
For what her detailed analysis of this case study reminds us is that depoliticisation, 
whatever its perceived advantages to the architects of neoliberal governmentality, 
does not always make for good or effective governance – and, as such, it does not 
necessarily make for stable governance. Consequently, here as elsewhere, the literature 
needs to be more attuned to some of the unanticipated (but predictable) pathological 
and potentially even crisis-prone consequences of depoliticisation – and the extent to 
which these might themselves contribute to tilting the always precarious and dynamic 
balance between politicised and depolicised modes of governance over time in one 
direction or the other.
Finally, and very simply, Ross Beveridge and Matthias Naumann seek to restore 
agents to the processes of politicisation and depoliticisation which, all too frequently 
in the existing literature (new and old alike), have been overlooked. They remind us, in 
effect, that all politics is made and remade by human hands and, more particularly, that 
despite the proliferation of global depoliticisation norms, resistance and coordinated 
local action can and does make a difference. Their article provides, I think, an excellent 
note on which to conclude. For while it might well be easier to see the human 
hands at work in consciously coordinated strategies aimed at repoliticisation (as in 
the case of the partial municipalisation of the Berlin Water Company in 2012 that 
they describe in some detail), depoliticisation too is the product of human agency. If 
there is a core challenge that remains for the literature on depoliticisation today it is 
surely to identify better, to describe in more detail and to explain more effectively 
the disparate and complex motivations of political elites as they continue to design 
and build institutions that prevent us from seeing clearly the political choices that 
govern our ostensibly democratic societies. That is no easy task, but in the final three 
articles of this collection above all I think I can begin to discern the route ahead for 
a second generation (rather than a second wave) of scholars working on these most 
pressing questions.
Note
1 Of course, this is not Schmitt’s conclusion – but herein lies the path to authoritarianism 
that many have discerned in his writing.
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